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Abstract 
The heterodoxy of Robert Clower, Axel Lei-
jonhufvud  and  Hyman  Minsky  consisted  in 
dispensing with the dominant assumption ac-
cording  to  which  the  system  spontaneously 
tends  to  a  situation  of  full  coordination.  In 
analysing the effective disequilibrium behav-
iour of the system, all three came to the con-
clusion  that  monetary  and  financial  forces 
have  a  crucial  importance  for  coordination 
and that their role can be highly destabilising. 
Contrary to the dominant theory, all three of-
fer useful insights to understand what is hap-
pening today.  
 
1  Introduction 
If he had been an economist rather than a novelist, Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez would have written Chronicle of a ‘Crisis’ Foretold. The 
symptoms of the current turmoil had long been before our eyes. 
Many non-mainstream economists had been denouncing them for 
years.
1 In the last two decades of the twentieth-century, the transac-
tions executed by the financial system-and, above all, the incomes 
distributed by it-had grown far faster than the real economy. With 
the tidal wave of liberalisation, financial techniques and innova-
tions had become more and more unscrupulous. In its unshakeable 
faith in the market, the mainstream deliberately insisted on ignoring 
all of this and adhered to the assumption that financial markets are 
efficient and know their business. While admitting the key role of 
imperfections in macroeconomics, in 2000 Olivier Blanchard [1] 
famously and proudly wondered What do we know about macro-
economics that Fisher and Wicksell did not?  
                                                 
1 See, for example, the Working Papers of the Jerome Levy Economic Institute 




With all due respect, slogans are often dangerous, and now, some 
years  later,  we  face  the  diametrically  and  dramatically  opposite 
question: What did Fisher and Wicksell know about macroeconom-
ics that we have ignored? More generally, what could heterodox 
views have taught the profession if it had been willing to listen? 
The present work naturally does not pretend to answer these crucial 
questions. Along the same lines, though, it reconsiders the contri-
bution  of  three  macroeconomists  who-rowing  against  the  cur-
rent-have kept the faith (each in his own way) to the Keynesian 
revolution. From this perspective, the next three sections offer a 
retrospective  on  the  thought  of  Robert  Clower,  of  Axel  Leijon-
hufvud and of Hyman Minsky. The last section concludes. 
2  The contribution of Robert Clower 
Clower’s key problem was the coordination of economic activity. 
He began by questioning the effectiveness of the price mechanism 
and the stability of general equilibrium (Section 2.1) and ended by 
reaffirming the crucial role of money in the economy (Section 2.2).  
2.1  The price mechanism and failures of coor-
dination 
When Clower came on the scene, the so-called Neoclassical Syn-
thesis had reaffirmed the effectiveness of the price mechanism and 
the stability of general equilibrium. The General Theory concerned 
the special case of wage and price rigidities. Only general equilib-
rium theory could be considered truly general. Clower [3: 34–58] 
objected that the Neoclassical Synthesis had turned the truth on its 
head.
2 General equilibrium theory concerned only the specific case 
of  full  employment  equilibrium.  Assuming  that  this  equilibrium 
was stable, the theory posited that disequilibrium states were transi-
tory and unimportant and could accordingly be ignored. Keynes’s 
1936 work was just what its title promised: a truly general theory. 
By calling the assumption of stability into question, Keynes had 
recognised that disequilibrium states were not necessarily transitory 
and in the real world were the norm. To complete the Keynesian 
revolution,  then,  it  was  necessary  to  extend  general  equilibrium 
theory to disequilibrium situations so that the effectiveness of the 
price mechanism and the stability of the system could be analysed 
instead of simply taken for granted.  
                                                 
2 In Clower’s view, the self-professed, ambitious Synthesis was actually a con-
cealed Keynesian counterrevolution that first stripped The General Theory of its 
most original and most vital features, and then brought it back into the neoclassi-
cal fold.   
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Let us start with the stability of general equilibrium. In Clower’s 
view, this was a dogma grounded on the primary, fundamental hy-
pothesis that economic activity was perfectly and costlessly coordi-
nated by an imaginary auctioneer, the anthropomorphic but none-
theless  impalpable  personification  of  the  invisible  forces  of  the 
market.
3 The postulate of constrained maximisation of utility by 
consumers and of profit by producers defined the traditional de-
mand and supply functions, which Clower termed notional. On this 
basis, tatônnement enabled the auctioneer to find the equilibrium 
price vector. So, it was the auctioneer that brought prices to their 
equilibrium level, ensuring the stability of general equilibrium. At 
this point the auctioneer himself gave the starting signal for ex-
changes, and the curtain rose on what was certain to be a happy 
ending. At equilibrium prices, every producer and every consumer 
would easily find his partner and fully realise his plans. 
Unfortunately, in the real world there are no magic wands or magic 
gavels. So, Clower [3: 34–58] removed the auctioneer and looked 
at the more realistic case of transactions at non-equilibrium prices, 
in which individuals’ plans cease to be mutually compatible. Under 
these circumstances, households are not generally able to realise 
their notional supply of labour. Given their budget constraints, they 
are forced to revise their planned demand for goods: the neoclassi-
cal assumption
4 of the unified decision yields to Clower’s dual de-
cision hypothesis. The result is actual or effective demand which, 
outside  equilibrium,  falls  below  traditional  notional  demand  be-
cause it is conditioned by quantity as well as by price constraints. 
In Clower’s view, this explained the link between consumption and 
income underlying the  Keynesian multiplier. Traditional demand 
theory  envisages  only  price  constraints;  it  only  holds  in  general 
equilibrium and cannot be extended to disequilibrium situations.  
Clower’s [3: 34–58] next step was to argue that prices are deter-
mined by effective demand, not by the notional demand of ortho-
dox theory. Seller are not interested in what consumers would like 
to buy if they could get the job they want, but what they can afford 
with the wages they are actually earning. Traditional notional ex-
cess demand, in this view, determined prices only when it coin-
cided with actual excess demand, that is when prices were already 
at their equilibrium level. But this meant that traditional price the-
ory too only held in general equilibrium and could not be extended 
outside it. As Clower wrote: “Orthodox price theory may be re-
                                                 
3 We introduce the auctioneer at this point for the sake of expositional continuity, 
although Clower himself used the concept only later. In the Counter-Revolution 
[3: 34–58], he still referred to the law of supply and demand. 
4 We use the term neoclassical in homage to the Synthesis; it would be more 




garded  as  a  special  case  of  Keynesian  economics,  valid  only  in 
conditions of full employment” [3: 55]. 
In  order  to  analyse  the  effective  role  of  the  price  mechanism, 
Clower then took into account a disequilibrium situation in which 
the price vector is wrong. Specifically, he considered the case in 
which, other things being equal, the price level is lower - and con-
sequently real wages higher - than the general equilibrium level. 
With this wrong price vector, the economy experiences a notional 
excess supply of labour and a notional excess demand for goods. 
Since households’ actual income is less than the notional, actual 
demand  for  consumer  goods  also  must  fall  below  the  notional 
level. It might then happen that actual demand will align with no-
tional supply. In this case, the price level would remain constant 
instead of rising to the right level required to clear the goods mar-
ket and the labour market simultaneously. By contrast, the excess 
supply of labour would drive wages below their equilibrium level. 
Although  perfectly  flexible,  prices  considered  as  a  whole  would 
fluctuate in the wrong direction, thus failing to bring the system to 
its  general  equilibrium.  Effective  demand  would  constrain  eco-
nomic activity below the full-employment level. Instead of tending 
to  its  general  equilibrium,  the  economy  would  be  trapped  in  a 
Keynesian under-employment equilibrium.  
These results led Clower to a fundamental change of mind. The 
removal  of  the  auctioneer  irreparably  undermined  traditional  de-
mand theory, traditional price theory and the stability of the general 
equilibrium. In his own words:  
“I shall be the last one to suggest that abstract theory is 
useless; that simply is not so. At the same time, I am 
convinced that much of what now passes for useful the-
ory is not only worthless economics (and mathematics) 
but also a positive hindrance to fruitful theoretical and 
empirical research.” [3: 56] 
In the absence of the auctioneer, the traditional theory had to be 
rewritten root and branch along the lines traced by Keynes.  
The  analytical  difficulties  involved  in  this  task  did  not  escape 
Clower:  
“[O]ne  would  thus  have  to  add  to  the  usual  price-
adjustment equations an extra and highly complex array 
of rationing rules that would specify just which agents 
transacted precisely what quantities of each commodity 
in every conceivable state of the economic system.” [3: 
256–266] 
Looking at the real world, however, Clower [3: 81–89] overcame 
these difficulties. To purchase goods, individuals do not necessarily  
  5 
have to be able to supply labour services or other goods. They need 
only have enough money. Put another way, the demand for goods 
is detached from the supply of labour and more generally of other 
goods. Expenditure is financed by money.
5 Thus, neither Say’s law 
nor  the  neoclassical  dichotomy  holds.  In  a  monetary  economy, 
money itself inevitably influences effective demand, price behav-
iour and the stability of the system. 
2.2 The crucial role of money 
The appearance of money led Clower to reconsider general equi-
librium theory. If exchanges take place at equilibrium prices, agents 
have no trouble in realising sale or purchase plans. But this would 
mean that all goods were liquid. Not by chance, neoclassical con-
sumers  can  finance  their  purchases  of  goods  indifferently  with 
money or with the supply of labour or of other goods. In neoclassi-
cal  theory,  then,  money  was  distinguished  from  other  goods  in 
name but not in function. General equilibrium theory consequently 
referred to a world of frictionless virtual barter [3: 81–89 and 107–
122]. Yet this is totally unrealistic. The economy in which we live 
is a monetary economy subject to the restriction that “money buys 
goods and goods buy money, but goods do not buy goods” [3: 86].  
This result raised a new question. Why is the real economy a mone-
tary  economy?  After  all,  by  imposing  money  as  medium  of  ex-
change, a monetary economy is more restrictive than a barter econ-
omy. Before analysing the role of money, its very existence had to 
be justified. Here Clower [3: 90–106 and 123–137] pointed out that 
in the real world trade is not perfectly and costlessly orchestrated 
from above. It depends on free interactions between individuals and 
requires a search and bargaining activity that is anything but simple 
or cost-free. Unlike the virtual barter of general equilibrium theory, 
real exchanges involve transaction costs that Clower specified as a 
U-shaped function of the length of the transaction period.  
It is here that exchange organisation comes into play. By reducing 
transaction  costs,  exchange  organisation  increases  the  welfare of 
individuals and of the society as a whole. More generally, the coor-
dination of economic activity does not depend only on prices, as 
the established theory maintained, but also on institutions like the 
market and money. The market (conceived as a meeting place for 
all agents interested in exchanging a particular good) lowers the 
cost of finding a trading partner. Money (as means of payment) 
                                                 
5 This is the basis of Clower’s dichotomised budget constraint, under which indi-
viduals purchase goods with the stock of money already accumulated and sepa-
rately  supply labour to replenish the  money stocks,  thus  keeping real  money 




eliminates the constraints of the double coincidence of wants and of 
the synchronisation of sales and purchases, thus also reducing trad-
ing costs. Outside the frictionless virtual barter underlying general 
equilibrium theory, money is all but neutral. Its introduction itself 
enables individuals to channel into productive activity labour and 
other resources that would otherwise be devoted to search and bar-
gaining. Although a monetary economy imposes more severe re-
strictions  than  a  barter  economy,  it  also  reduces  agents’  trading 
costs. 
Having  justified  the  existence  of  money,  Clower  turned  to  the 
analysis of its role. He [3: 90–94] recognised that, in the imaginary 
barter of general equilibrium theory, the quantity of money could 
only influence the absolute price level.  In  a monetary economy, 
however, demand for goods is effective only if ‘it involves a com-
bination of desire with money purchasing power’ independently of 
when and how individuals procure it [3: 87]. In this case, however, 
the quantity of money will inevitably have an impact on effective 
demand, effective price behaviour and the effective workings of the 
system.  
According to Clower, money is set apart from other goods by virtue 
of its being the sole medium of exchange. This is accordingly the 
criterion for determining  what is money and what is not.  In his 
view, the other traditional functions of money  are secondary [3: 
95–106 and 107–122]. Money would not be a store of value, for 
example, if it was not first of all a means of exchange. Observing 
how payments are actually made in the real world, Clower then 
defined money to include not only currency and bank deposits but 
also - and  above  all - trade  credit.  His  conclusion  was  that  the 
money supply is largely endogenous. In his view, the various com-
ponents of the money supply are connected by pyramidal reserve 
ratios, with currency at the apex, currency-backed deposits in the 
middle, and currency- and deposit-backed trade credit at the bot-
tom.  
An expansion of economic activity would give rise to an increase in 
the endogenous components of the money supply, namely deposits 
and trade credit. In this way, it would alter the pyramidal reserve 
ratios. Above certain prudential thresholds, this could undermine 
confidence in the financial system, thereby provoking a flight from 
trade credit to deposits and from deposits to currency. Such a flight 
would trigger a credit crunch liable to drive the economy into re-
cession. In short, due to the pyramid of reserve ratios, the endoge-
nous nature of the money supply might aggravate the instability of  
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the system.
6 With the benefit of hindsight, all of this seems famil-
iar. 
Clower’s contribution to monetary economics was thus to point out 
that, in a properly defined monetary economy, money is anything 
but neutral. Its introduction as a medium of exchange reduces trad-
ing costs and so favours coordination to the benefit of individuals 
and social welfare. The quantity of money affects expenditure and 
thus the behaviour of prices and the stability of the system. From 
this point of view, the endogenous component of money supply has 
a pro-cyclical behaviour that may prove to be destabilising. These 
conclusions  fortified  Clower’s  dissent  from  general  equilibrium 
theory. To understand the real world, we have to jettison the dis-
torting lens of traditional theory.
7 
“Strictly interpreted, neowalrasian theory is descriptive 
only of a fairytale world (…). It is science fiction, pure 
and  simple - clever  and  elegant  science  fiction,  no 
doubt, but science fiction all the same” [3: 252].  
3  The contribution of Axel Leijonhufvud 
Axel Leijonhufvud’s starting point was Kenneth Arrow’s illuminat-
ing question: in the neoclassical economy  where everybody is a 
price-taker,  who  ever  sets  prices?  In  answering,  it  was  Leijon-
hufvud himself who devised the metaphor of the auctioneer, reach-
ing a position similar to that of Clower [3: 34–58]. Keynes did not 
introduce wage and price rigidity: he simply rejected the equally 
extreme assumption of perfect price flexibility.
8  
From  his  very  first  writings,  Leijonhufvud  adopted  an  inter-
temporal  perspective  based  on  Wicksell’s  saving-investment  ap-
proach. In his way, he referred to Wicksell long before Woodford 
and  his  followers.  On  this  basis,  Leijonhufvud  first  showed  that 
Keynes’s involuntary unemployment was due to high interest rates, 
not high wages. This interest rate maladjustment in turn reflected 
speculators’ ignorance of the future and was persistent in nature 
(Section 3.1). Next, he showed that money was indispensable to 
explain coordination as well as its failures (Section 3.2).  
3.1  Intertemporal effective demand failures 
                                                 
6 On the endogenous nature of the money supply and its destabilising effects, see 
Clower [3: 107–122 and 209–217]. 
7 For a more detailed and complete analysis of Clower’s contribution, see [4]. 
8 So, Leijonhufvud too rejected the reductive interpretation of Keynes proposed 
by Keynesians of the Synthesis. That is why his famous 1968 book is entitled On 




The basic presupposition of  Leijonhufvud’s  analysis was that-to 
move from Walras to Keynes-one did not need to deny the general 
equilibrium scheme but only to remove the auctioneer, i.e. the as-
sumption of full information and  coordination.  Leijonhufvud ac-
cordingly  took  equilibrium  as  a  synonym  for  general  economic 
equilibrium and used it as an ideal benchmark on the basis of which 
to define economic pathologies.
9  
The core of his ideal equilibrium was the market for saving and 
investment out of full-employment income, considered respectively 
as the demand for and supply of future (rather than current) con-
sumption goods. The real rate of interest (the relative price of cur-
rent in terms of future goods) performs the function of coordinating 
the two, clearing the goods market. In financial terms, however, 
saving represents the demand for new securities and the supply of 
new loanable funds; investment, conversely, their respective supply 
and demand. Thus, assuming that the initial stocks are at desired 
levels, the real interest rate determined by the equilibrium of the 
goods market also clears the securities (loans) market. In homage to 
Wicksell, this common equilibrium value can be called the natural 
rate  of  interest.
10  Equilibrium  in  the  labour  and  money  markets 
gives, respectively, the full-employment real income and the level 
of prices. In line with the quantity theory, the system is dichoto-
mous and money is neutral. 
Let us now suppose that the initial full information equilibrium, 
corresponding  to  point  0  (the  intersection  between  S0  and  I0)  in 
Figure 1, is hit by a typical Keynesian recessionary shock, namely a 
fall in the marginal efficiency of capital. The investment function 
shifts to the left (from I0 to I1), opening up an equal excess (00’) of 
saving over investment, which in turn implies an equivalent excess 
supply of goods and excess demand for securities. The latter pro-
duces a rise in the prices and a fall in the yield of securities, driving 
the interest rate to the new, lower natural level, r1. The system thus 
reaches the new full-employment equilibrium represented by point 
1. In the ideal neoclassical world of full information, the flexibility 
of the interest rate instantly brings the system back into full em-
ployment equilibrium, even if the latter now implies a lower rate of 
capital accumulation and of growth. 
                                                 
9 From the methodological standpoint, however, this choice raises some doubts. 
In order to properly define coordination failures, we should refer to reality in its 
optimal conditions rather than to an ideal but non-existent world. Using the gen-
eral equilibrium model as a benchmark, Leijonhufvud exposed himself to the risk 
of considering as normal what actually is artificial and as pathological what actu-
ally is normal. On this, see [5]. 
10 For Leijonhufvud’s saving-investment approach, we refer to [12] and to [13: 
3–15 and 131–202].  
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At this point Leijonhufvud abandons the ideal for the real world. 
His thesis is that when full information does not obtain, the rate of 
interest (albeit remaining perfectly flexible) falls to the unnatural 
level of r0’ in Figure 1, not all the way to the new equilibrium level 
of r1. In Wicksell’s terms, the market interest rate stays above the 
natural rate. What curbs the fall in interest rates is the financial 
markets’ ignorance of the future. Not being directly involved in the 
process  of  production,  the  holders  of  securities  have  no  way  of 
sensing the fall in the marginal efficiency of capital. In homage to 
past experience, they therefore continue to consider the previous 
rate of interest, r0, as normal. Expecting a rise in yields from r0’ to 
r0, they sell part of their securities portfolio, neutralising the excess 
demand from savers.  In clearing the securities  market, however, 
speculators  unbalance  the  money  market.  The  excess  supply  of 
goods now implies an equivalent excess demand for money (rather 
than for securities). In line with the Quantity Theory, what now 
falls is nominal spending (not the interest rate). 
11 
It is here that Keynes’s quantity adjustments come into play,
12 turn-
ing the fall in nominal spending into a decline in real income and 
                                                 
11 It is worthwhile noticing that the full-employment saving and investment func-
tions might also intersect at a negative interest rate in Figure 1. In this case, the 
system would have no natural interest rate and no general equilibrium. 
12 In the absence of quantity adjustments, the destabilising interference of the 
speculators and the consequent interest rate maladjustment would have been only 
temporary. As their stock of securities is not unlimited, speculators cannot con-
tinue to sell them for cash indefinitely. In time, moreover, their expectations of a 
rise in the rate will be proven mistaken and they will be forced to adapt their 
views. To simplify, Leijonhufvud then assumes that the speculative sales of se-
curities cease and give way to the quantity adjustments, as a result of which the 
maladjustment  of  the  interest  rate  is  detached  from  speculation  and  becomes 
persistent. 
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saving. The effective saving function (S0”) shifts to the left of the 
notional saving function (S0), bringing the system to the Keynesian 
unemployment ‘disequilibrium’ represented by point 0”. Not only 
does  the  fall  in  income  push  employment  below  the  full-
employment level. Above all, it jeopardises the re-equilibrating role 
of the price mechanism. Becoming only notional, the excess of sav-
ing (0’’0’’’) now ceases to be perceived by the market. The result is 
that prices fall in the wrong way. At point 0” of Figure 1, savers’ 
demand for securities is equal to the supply. The market interest 
rate thus stabilises at the unnatural level r0’. At the same time, the 
excess supply of labour cumulatively drives wages below the right 
value, aggravating the disequilibrium. Full price flexibility not only 
loses its equilibrating capacity, it becomes destabilizing. 
Thus, in Leijonhufvud’s view, Keynes countered neoclassical de-
viation-counteracting price adjustments with deviation-amplifying 
quantity  adjustments  that  are  self-cumulating.  The  prototype  of 
such processes is the Keynesian multiplier. As in Kahn, the multi-
plier tends to die out with time. Instead of imploding, the economy 
settles into a state of disequilibrium. The resulting involuntary un-
employment does not necessarily posit a false price for labour. It 
might simply require a false price in one of the other n-1 markets, 
for instance a wrong interest rate. If this is the case, wage and price 
flexibility is not a solution. By altering excess demands, quantity 
adjustments have defused and distorted its re-equilibrating proper-
ties,  thus  jeopardizing  the  tendency  of  the  system  to  its  general 
equilibrium.  
3.2  The failures and successes of coordination 
As we have seen, Leijonhufvud recognised the merit of The Gen-
eral Theory in introducing quantity adjustments and thus allowing 
for instability. But he rejected The General Theory’s second major 
innovation,  namely  the  liquidity  preference  theory  of  interest 
rates.
13 This theory reversed the roles of the interest rate and of in-
come in the adjustment process. In Leijonhufvud’s view, this rever-
sal  had  two  devastating  consequences.  By  assuming  that  money 
market equilibrium determines the interest rate rather than income, 
the liquidity preference theory burns the bridge back to the ancient 
and honorable Quantity Theory [13: 132]. By assuming that goods 
market equilibrium determines income rather than interest rate, it 
severs all ties with Wicksell. Barring any tendency of the market 
rate to its natural level, however, means to deny any tendency of 
the system to its general equilibrium. 
                                                 
13 With this, Leijonhufvud admits the sensitivity of money demand to interest 
rates, but denies that the rate of interest is what clears the money market.  
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So, if in introducing quantity adjustments The General Theory ad-
mitted instability, in adding the liquidity preference hypothesis it 
ultimately negated the possibility of stability. Accordingly, Leijon-
hufvud rejected the liquidity preference theory, expressly accepting 
only half of the Keynesian revolution. A truly general theory, he 
argued, had to explain coordination, not only its failures. After all, 
the natural world offers many examples of this ambivalence. An 
exceptional wave may unbalance a boat and make it capsize. But if 
the wave is of normal magnitude, the boat is equipped to handle it 
and so gradually regains its equilibrium.  
Drawing  on  Clower  [3:  81–89],  Leijonhufvud  then  revisited  the 
Keynesian  consumption  function  with  a  critical  eye.  Consumers 
actually  accumulate  adequate  stocks  of  liquid  assets  (money)  in 
order to stabilise consumption against fluctuations in income. Thus, 
in the case of a recessionary shock that is no longer or sharper than 
expected, the stocks of liquid assets (money) are large enough to 
sever  the  link  between  income  and  consumption  and  the  related 
cumulative quantity adjustments. As a result, the traditional price 
mechanism can gradually re-equilibrate the system. In the excep-
tional case of a recessionary shock that is stronger or longer than 
expected, the stocks of liquid assets (money) are not large enough 
to sever the link between income and consumption. The multiplier 
comes into play, leading to Keynes’s unemployment disequilibrium 
and  jeopardising  the  effectiveness  of  the  price  mechanism.  The 
boat capsizes!  
Leijonhufvud’s [13: 103–129] conclusion was that there is a corri-
dor around the fully coordinated growth path. Starting from this 
path, if the economy is hit by a shock of normal magnitude and 
duration, it stays within the corridor. Thanks to the traditional price 
mechanism, it tends to come gradually back to the ideal path and 
keep to it. If the shock is too strong or too long-lasting, however, 
the economy is thrown outside the corridor. Now prey to Keynes’s 
deviation-amplifying  quantity  adjustments,  it  gets  trapped  in  a 
Keynesian unemployment disequilibrium that price flexibility can-
not remove. The corridor metaphor thus proposes a synthesis em-
bracing both the ambivalence of real-world economies and the con-
tending views of Keynes and the neoclassics. In this perspective, 
The General Theory continues to be more general, because it al-
lows for quantity adjustments. Yet its contribution consists in add-
ing the area outside the corridor, where the pathology of persistent 
unemployment dominates.
14 
                                                 
14 This result seems to be a consequence of the use of general equilibrium as a 
benchmark. Once the neoclassical Olympus is cloaked in earthly normality, The 




The corridor metaphor reflects the impulse-propagation approach. 
In other works, however, Leijonhufvud recognised that the destabi-
lising tendencies may arise endogenously from the monetary and 
financial sector. In an article written with Clower [3: 209–217], for 
instance, he recognised the endogenous nature of the money supply 
and its possible destabilising effects. More recently, he has focused 
on financial instability and on its linkages with monetary policy 
[15].
15 Leijonhufvud was one of those who anticipated the recent 
financial turmoil long before it happened.  
4  The contribution of Hyman Minsky 
Hyman Minsky presented his financial instability hypothesis as an 
interpretation  of  Keynes’s  The  General  Theory  and  is  generally 
seen as a leading Post Keynesian. Regardless of his Keynesian af-
filiation, Minsky was definitely a heterodox economist. This is wit-
nessed by his rejection of the equilibrium approach (Section 3.1) in 
favour of a cyclical perspective (Section 3.2). Thus, while the neo-
classical  egg settles stably down on its side,  Minsky’s  egg rolls 
endlessly and irregularly around in a permanent state of disequilib-
rium. As we shall see, money and finance play a crucial role in this 
perpetual motion.  
4.1  The rejection of the equilibrium approach 
Drawing his inspiration from Keynes [8,9], Minsky assigned a cen-
tral role to the uncertainty arising from the ignorance of the future. 
Under these circumstances, what matters is not only expectations 
about the future but also the degree of confidence in them. As we 
shall see, money and finance catalyze the changing degree of con-
fidence and pass it on to the real economy. 
Let us start with money. By allowing the fulfilment of payment 
obligations associated with economic activity, money offers insur-
ance services against bankruptcy. This is money’s main function 
[26:180].  The  value  of  these  services  (of  money’s  liquidity)  de-
pends on the degree of confidence. As confidence increases, liquid-
ity preference falls. In Minsky’s view, money is not an alternative 
to  consumption  goods  but  instead  to  the  other  components  of 
wealth. The decrease in liquidity preference thus leads to a reallo-
cation of wealth from money to non-monetary assets. The higher 
demand for financial assets corresponds to an increase in the supply 
                                                                                                              
voluntary unemployment, the ineffectiveness of the price mechanism and the real 
effects of money become mere pathologies.  
15 Many of his recent works on the current financial crisis can be found in VOX, 
Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists, avai-
lable online.   
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of credit. The higher demand for capital assets raises their demand 
price above the supply price. These two prices represent the ful-
crum of Minsky’s transmission mechanism.
16 In line with Tobin’s 
q,
17 the excess of the demand over the supply price stimulates capi-
tal accumulation. Thus, thanks to money, greater confidence trans-
lates into a debt-financed increase in investment.  
Let us now consider finance. In Minsky’s view, advanced capitalist 
economies imply large and costly long-term investment that needs 
external  financing.  This  presupposes  the  expectation  that  invest-
ment generates sufficient profits to service the corresponding debt. 
Given uncertainty over the future, however, this expectation can 
also prove mistaken  and lead to insolvency.  As a safety margin 
against this risk, firms and their financiers require an excess of the 
present value of expected profits (the demand price) over the cost 
(the supply price) of investment goods.
18 To this end, they hold 
externally financed investment below the level that would be opti-
mal under conditions of certainty. In Minsky’s view, it is here that 
confidence comes into play. An increase in confidence reduces de-
sired safety margins on indebtedness,
19 increasing the availability 
both to lend and to borrow in order to invest. The result is an exter-
nally financed increase in investment. This time thanks to finance, 
the higher confidence turns again into a debt financed investment 
expansion.  
The active role of money and finance is what underlies Minsky’s 
upward instability proposition. Though generally neglected in the 
literature,  this  proposition  seems  to  be  a  keystones  in  the  entire 
Minskian construction.  In his schema, tranquillity  fosters  greater 
confidence in the future. As we have seen, this decreases the value 
of the insurance (liquidity) embodied in the dollar and reduces the 
desired safety margins, which leads to a debt-financed increase in 
                                                 
16 For the two prices, see [10]. 
17 On the q theory, see [2]. 
18 If realised profits turn out to be less than expected, safety margins on indebt-
edness will increase firms’ capacity to meet debt commitments and reduce bank 
losses. If realised profits are as expected or greater, safety margins on indebted-
ness represent the compensation to firms and their financiers for their respective 
risks. 
19 As we have seen, safety margins on indebtedness reflect the degree of confi-
dence of firms and their financiers. In Minsky’s view, they thus acquire a more 
general significance as proxy for the whole set of safety margins existing within 
the financial system. As an example, as confidence increases, the decrease in 
required risk premiums on indebtedness also signals, on the one hand, the fall in 
liquidity as a proportion of wealth and, on the other hand, the worsening in the 
time synchronisation between cash receipts and debt commitments that (as we 
shall  see)  is  at  the  basis  of  the  famous  Minskian  distinction  between  hedge, 





20 Minsky’s conclusion was that stability-or tranquilli-
ty-is destabilising and the fundamental instability is upward.
21  
Minsky applied this upward instability proposition to every coher-
ent situation, be it under-employment equilibrium, full-employment 
equilibrium or steady growth.
22 On these bases, he did not merely 
reject these traditional kinds of coherency, he banished the equilib-
rium approach outright. Under the upward instability proposition, 
every situation nurtures forces for change, and these forces are di-
rected upwards.
23 It follows that  
“[t]he use of the term equilibrium…may be misleading. 
It may be best to borrow a term from Joan Robinson and 
call situations in which rapid disruptive changes are not 
taking place periods of tranquility, noting that tranquility 
is  disrupted  by  investment  booms,  accelerating  infla-
tions,  financial  and  monetary  crises,  and  debt  defla-
tions.” [26:176] 
Together with the equilibrium approach, Minsky obviously rejected 
the traditional re-equilibrating role of the price mechanism.
24 In his 
view, the latter had to be replaced by quantity mechanisms that are 
mutually cumulative. As a result, fluctuations in investment (the 
most  unstable  component  of  autonomous  expenditure)  produce 
amplified fluctuations in income. Minsky’s theory  is “an invest-
                                                 
20 In Minsky’s words [26:183]: “[B]ut tranquility diminishes the value of the 
insurance (liquidity) embodied in the dollar, so that a rise in the absolute and 
relative prices of capital and financial assets that are valued mainly for income 
will take place. Tranquility therefore leads to an increase in acceptable debt to 
equity ratios even as it raises the value of inherited capital assets. The endoge-
nously determined value of liquidity means that each possible equilibrium of the 
economy contains disequilibrating forces”. 
21 For the two quotations, see -respectively- [21:127, 22:37] and [20:272, 21: 
165]. 
22 About under-employment equilibrium, see [21: 61, 127, 165] and [22: 36–37]. 
More generally, according to Minsky, the upward instability proposition comes 
from Keynes himself [21:68]. For full-employment equilibrium, see [20: 268, 23: 
26, 26: 177 and 183]. About growth, see [17, 19, 20]. 
23 To quote Minsky [26: 129]: “Any transitory tranquillity is transformed into an 
expansion.” The concept is put forward repeatedly in his [23]. 
24 Minsky [21, 22, 26] rejected the Patinkin resolution that flexible prices end up 
coordinating all the markets. According to him, in conformity with the experi-
ence of 1929-33 and the true thought of Keynes, the fall in prices can further 
depress aggregate demand and aggravate unemployment instead of reabsorbing 
it. The reason is twofold. To start with, wage and price deflation increases the 
real burden of debt. This may induce firms to reduce their borrowing, with de-
pressive effects on investment. In addition, insofar as it is associated with a fall 
in profits, price deflation decreases firms’ ability to honour past commitments. In 
this way it jeopardises the robustness of the financial system, with depressing 
effects on long-term expectations and investment.   
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ment theory of the business cycle” [22:30]. In this theory, as we 
shall see, money and finance are crucial: they trigger and feed Min-
sky’s cumulative processes, and also contribute to the reversal of 
their direction.  
4.2 Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ 
Minsky’s  hypothesis  presupposes  a  set  of  implicit  assumptions 
whose generality would appear to be questionable.
25 Minsky him-
self may well have realised this, as is perhaps implicit in the very 
choice of the term hypothesis rather than theory. Here, however, we 
ignore these doubts, focusing on the crucial role of money and fi-
nance in the Minskian business cycle.  
Let us then start with Minsky’s upward instability proposition. A 
period of tranquillity (in which the financial system is robust and 
there  are  no  relevant  shocks,  so  that  profits  are  systematically 
greater than debt commitments) fosters confidence in the future. 
The result is a re-allocation of wealth from money to non-monetary 
assets and a fall in desired safety margins, which stimulate credit 
and  capital  accumulation.  Thus,  tranquillity  leads  to  a  debt-
financed investment expansion.  
Expansion in turn triggers cumulative processes based on the in-
vestment-profits-investment link. Through the increase in income, 
the rise in investment stimulates profits; the consequent improve-
ment  in  profit  expectations  and  confidence  further  increases  in-
vestment  itself.  These  cumulative  investment-profits-investment 
processes are strengthened by the monetary and financial markets. 
In the growing optimism of the upswing, the speculative demand 
for money falls in favour of non-monetary assets. The increase in 
bank credit and in money supply further stimulates the demand for 
non-monetary assets. The ensuing rise in asset prices feeds itself 
through the expectations of capital gains. The consequent increase 
in wealth stimulates the propensity to borrow and to lend. In the 
case of capital assets, the rise in Tobin’s q and the fall in the safety 
                                                 
25 As an example, let us consider the upward instability proposition. This propo-
sition seems questionable, especially at the lower turning-point of the business 
cycle. Following Minsky, let us assume that tranquillity decreases the value of 
the insurance embodied in money. What Minsky neglects is that, if expected 
profits were zero, this would not stimulate the demand for (the demand price of) 
investment goods. Alternatively, the stimulus might not be enough to drive the 
demand price above the supply price. In either case, investment would not rise 
and tranquillity alone would not be sufficient to trigger recovery. Moreover, the 
upward instability proposition cannot be attributed to Keynes as Minsky does in 
[21: 165]. After all, the main message of The General Theory seems to consist 
precisely in the possible persistence of the slump. On the perplexities raised by 




margins  needed  boost  externally-financed  investment.  All  this 
feeds  the  cumulative  investment-profits-investment  processes, 
transforming the expansion into a debt-financed investment boom. 
At this point, Minsky points to two drawbacks to the boom. As in-
vestment increases, external financing grows proportionally more 
than internal, so the ratio between the two (the gearing ratio) inces-
santly  rises,
26  driving  up  the  incidence  of  debt  commitments  on 
profits. In the general euphoria, debt commitments end by rising 
above profits. In expectations of a future bonanza, firms begin to 
repay their principal by debt (speculative finance) and then even 
interest payments (ultra-speculative or Ponzi finance). The honour-
ing of debt commitments no longer comes out of profits (hedge 
finance) but out of borrowing. Debt is rolled over (speculative fi-
nancing) or compounded with interest payments (ultra-speculative 
or Ponzi financing).
27 As a result, the initially robust financial sys-
tem turns fragile.
28 The second drawback is that the persistence of 
the  boom  inevitably  generates  either  bottlenecks  in  the  financial 
                                                 
26 Minsky’s assertion on the gearing ratio is anything but granted. According to 
Steindl [27], for instance, internal funds have a higher income elasticity than 
external. As income grows, the rise in the desired gearing ratio is thus associated 
with a fall (not an increase) in the actual ratio. To bridge this gap, firms increase 
externally-financed  investment,  strengthening  the  income  expansion.  But  this 
further widens the gap between desired and actual ratio. The main implications 
of Steindl’s analysis are two. First, contrary to Minsky’s theses, this time the 
actual gearing ratio moves counter-cyclically, falling in the upswing and vice 
versa. Second, this behaviour leads to the paradox of debt: the attempt to increa-
se the gearing ratio implies an income expansion that instead decreases it. Lavoie 
[11] and Hein [7] reduce Minsky’s and Steindl’s views to a unitary framework. 
In assuming that firms meet their debt commitments before investing, however, 
these works exclude the speculative finance that was so central to Minsky. 
27 Minsky’s famous distinction between hedge, speculative and ultra-speculative 
finance (or Ponzi) concerns the timing of cash receipts and cash commitments. In 
the case of hedge finance, creditors and debtors foresee cash receipts greater than 
debt commitments in every single period of the life of the loan. In the case of 
non-hedge finance, this holds only for the distant future. Given the expectation of 
a future bonanza, the plan concerning the present and the near future is to cover 
principal (speculative units) and interest as well (ultra-speculative or Ponzi units) 
by  borrowing.  Given  their  dependency  on  credit,  speculative  and  ultra-
speculative units are more fragile. 
28 Due to its over-optimism, the fragile financial system has allowed its safety 
margins to fall below the danger level; so even a minor shock can provoke finan-
cial crisis, debt deflation and insolvencies. See [18]. Specifically, firms would 
have  insufficient  liquidity,  profits,  and  borrowing  capacity  to  discharge  their 
inherited debt commitments. Their only alternative would be to reduce debt and 
debt service by liquidating non-monetary assets. But the resulting fall in asset 
prices would imply the risk of selling them off and of becoming insolvent.  
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system or inflationary pressures in the goods market that require a 
monetary restriction. In either case, interest rate rise.
29  
The  high  interest  rate  ends  the  boom,  reversing  the  investment-
profit-investment  chain  into  a  downward  spiral.  The  unexpected 
increase in the cost of funds is thus associated with an unexpected 
fall in already insufficient profits. Given financial fragility, honour-
ing  existing  commitments  would  require  increasing  indebtedness 
still further; and more than undesirable, this is actually impossible, 
since the confidence that underpins borrowing collapses. Thus we 
have financial crisis, a situation in which [25] firms’ debt commit-
ments cannot be discharged in the ordinary way, i.e. out of profits 
(hedge finance) or by borrowing (speculative and Ponzi finance).  
With the outbreak of the crisis, the only way to honour debt obliga-
tions is to sell assets, which after the boom are mainly illiquid. The 
increase in liquidity preference, the contraction in bank credit and 
in money supply and the expectation of capital losses reinforce as-
set  sales  and  the  decrease  in  asset  prices.  The  resulting  fall  in 
wealth, together with the increase in desired safety margins, inten-
sifies the need to reduce indebtedness by selling assets. Asset prices 
plummet. The fall in the price of real capital goods feeds back into 
investment  and  profits,  and  vice-versa.
30  Monetary  and  financial 
markets thus feed the downward spiral based on the real link in-
vestment-profits-investment. The financial crisis turns into a debt 
deflation, which in Minsky’s framework also involves deflation of 
asset prices as well as profits [25].  
In the end, the debt deflation makes it impossible to honour com-
mitments, triggering a wave of bankruptcies, and ultimately deep 
depression. In Minsky’s view, however, depression itself has also a 
cathartic role.
31 The only survivors are the hedge units (still able to 
repay their debt commitments out of profits). Under the upward 
instability proposition, a new phase of tranquillity is then sufficient 
to bolster confidence, reactivating the whole sequence: a new debt-
financed expansion, speculative boom, financial crisis, debt defla-
tion and depression. Minsky [24, 26] found empirical confirmation 
                                                 
29Minsky [22: 45] puts it as follows: “However, the internal workings of the 
banking mechanism or Central Bank action to constrain inflation will result in 
the supply of finance being less than infinitely elastic leading to a rapid increase 
in short term interest rates”. In Minsky’s view, this increase will then spread 
from the short to the long run, with depressive effects on investment. 
30 In Minsky’s view, while the fall in the demand price for capital goods (i.e., in 
the present value of expected profits) depresses investment and profits, the con-
sequent fall in profit expectations reduces the demand price for capital goods. 
31 “However, it is worth noting that during the liquidation phase of a deep de-
pression the financial stage is set for a long-wave expansion as debts are reduced, 
equity assets decline in value, and the stock of ultimate liquidity increases” [18: 




for his analysis in the real-world economy. To his own question 
Can ‘It’ happen again? Minsky [24] answered that another Great 
Depression was indeed possible.  
On these presuppositions, Minsky assigned a crucial role to eco-
nomic policy institutions. In his view, the central bank should con-
centrate on its function as a lender of last resort.
32 Funding finan-
cial institutions and sustaining asset prices, it might prevent or re-
absorb financial crises, and so ward off debt deflation and depres-
sion. The task of stabilising and sustaining the economy, instead, 
should be assigned to government.
33 However, the financial system 
must also be carefully regulated, and the economic policy authori-
ties themselves must always be on guard. Capitalism is an evolving 
system; its chameleon-like flaws are always in ambush. These are 
the main messages of Minsky’s famous 1986 book: Stabilising an 
Unstable Economy. 
Apart from the proper tasks of monetary and fiscal policies, Minsky 
[21,26] proposed a more general rethinking of the ultimate targets 
of economic policy, questioning the dominant myth of investment–
led growth. Investment is a highly unstable component of aggregate 
demand; it may turn out to be a failure and compromise economic 
activity.
34 Growth does not converge on a uniform, steady rate. It 
jeopardises the robustness of the financial system and consequently 
tends to be shaken by financial crises, debt-deflations and depres-
sions.  
5. Conclusion 
Axel Leijonhufvud’s metaphor of the Swedish flag is a useful in-
troductory approach to macroeconomic theory.
35 Starting with the 
                                                 
32 Minsky does not have much faith in monetary fine tuning: “Monetary policy to 
constrain undue expansion and inflation operates by way of disrupting financial 
markets and asset values. Monetary policy to induce expansion operates by inter-
est rates and the availability of credit, which do not yield increased investment if 
current and anticipated profits are low” [26: 303–304].  
33 Specifically, “Fiscal policies are more powerful economic control weapons 
than monetary manipulations” [26: 304]. The government has not only the tradi-
tional function of sustaining and stabilising aggregate demand and employment, 
but also that of stabilising the financial system. By avoiding the rise in profits 
due to an investment expansion, automatic  fiscal stabilisers  might defuse the 
speculative boom and financial crisis. By sustaining profits above inherited debt 
commitments during a post-crisis investment slowdown, automatic fiscal stabi-
lisers might blunt the tendency to a debt deflation and a deep depression [26]. 
34Bad investments may generate profits too small to repay debt and thus result in 
a wave of bankruptcies that depress economic activity. 
35 For the Swedish flag, see-for instance- Leijonhufvud [14: 3–32 and 33–51] . 
The flag reflects the impulse-propagation approach. The impulse is the initial 
shock.  The  propagation  mechanism  is  the  maladjustment  that  jams  the  re- 
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dichotomous nature of the ideal neoclassical world, both impulses 
and propagation mechanisms can be classified as either nominal or 
real. Combining the possibilities, we get a four-square table, which 
Leijonhufvud  patriotically  overlays  on  the  Swedish  flag.  In  his 
hands,  the  flag  then  becomes  an  instrument  for  describing  the 
course of the macroeconomic debate in the twentieth century. By 
his reconstruction, the dominant macroeconomic theory made the 
full round of the flag, but lost sight of the economics of Keynes and 
of coordination failures.  
The Swedish flag brings a key issue to light. Though assuming ever 
new and more sophisticated facets, the dominant macroeconomic 
theory  has  always  referred  to  the  benchmark  of  general  equilib-
rium.  According  to  the  mainstream,  this  represents  the  state  of 
health of the system, on which analysis must be focused. Devia-
tions are pathologies of minor importance, a residue that can be 
tranquilly ignored.
36 With this, coordination was taken for granted. 
Economic policy, institutions, the rules of the game - these could 
only spoil the perfection of market mechanisms. Today we know 
just how big a mistake all of this was. 
The merit of Robert Clower, Axel Leijonhufvud and Hyman Min-
sky consisted precisely in dispensing with the unrealistic assump-
tion of full coordination. In analysing the effective disequilibrium 
behaviour  of  the  system,  all  three  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
monetary and/or financial forces have a crucial importance for co-
ordination and that their role can be highly destabilising. Contrary 
to the dominant theory, all three offer useful insights to understand 
what is happening today.  
Specifically,  the  current  financial  turmoil  seems  to  validate 
Minksy’s thesis that instability mainly lurks in the financial sphere 
of the economy. Paradoxically, however, Minsky’s view is also the 
most optimistic. Under his upward instability proposition, after the 
storm comes the calm, and tranquillity inevitably brings recovery. 
In  the  framework  of  Leijonhufvud  and  Clower,  by  contrast,  the 
slump  can  also  be  persistent.  In  Leijonhufvud,  this  persistency 
represents the exceptional case of an economy that has gotten out-
side  the  corridor.  For  Clower - as  for  Keynes - this  persistency 
may (and tends to) be normal.  
                                                                                                              
equilibrating mechanisms of the general equilibrium ideal world, translating the 
shock into fluctuations in real income and employment. 
36 According to the transcript of his talk, Robert Lucas claimed [16]: “The prob-
lem is that in the new theories, the theories embedded in general equilibrium 
dynamics of the sort that we know how to use pretty well now, there is a residue 
of things they don’t let us think about. They don’t let us think about the US ex-
perience in the 1930s or about financial crises and their real consequences in 




What  can  we  conclude  about  money  and  finance?  According  to 
Clower and Leijonhufvud, their main role consists – respectively – 
in constraining and containing expenditure and economic activity 
below their full employment levels. This is in line with Keynes’s 
belief that capitalism tends to stagnation. According to Minsky, by 
contrast, the fundamental instability of capitalism is upward.
37 Fi-
nance, however, sets limits to this tendency. Minsky’s main merit 
seems to consist precisely in showing that growth does not conver-
ge to a uniform and constant rate, but leads to financial fragility and 
financial crises.  
From  a  European  perspective,  the  Minskyan  upward  instability 
seems ‘difficult to swallow’. It, however,  might also be questioned 
from an American perspective. After all – in spite of the support 
from technological innovation in the 1990s and from the Fed’s ex-
pansionary policy in the 2000s – the American economy has failed 
to avoid a new depression. The re-reading of the financial instabili-
ty  hypothesis  in  the  light  of  Keynes’s  ‘stagnationist’  approach 
might  then  reconcile  our  three  authors.  From  this  perspective, 
Minsky’s contribution would consist in showing that finance can 
sustain and prolong growth, but not prevent (indeed, even accentua-
ting) the collapse. 
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